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Multilateral Development Banks

World Bank publishes ‘first study of exclusion systems around the globe’​

By | Bribery, Corruption, Multilateral Development Banks, Sanctions, World Bank | No Comments

The World Bank has just published the results of a pilot survey into the structure and operation of exclusion systems in eleven different jurisdictions around the world including Australia, Brazil, Tunisia, the US, the EC and the World Bank. The pilot examined six key areas relating to the variously described ‘exclusion’, ‘debarment’, ‘disqualification’, ‘suspension’ or ‘blacklisting’ powers used against wayward suppliers within these procurement systems. The examined areas included such issues at the grounds for exclusion, whether they are publicly listed, the length of debarment and the effect on current and future contracts.

Possibly the most interesting finding suggests that “most jurisdictions indicated that exclusions are generally between one and five years in length”. However, it is not uncommon to see debarments of between five to fourteen years in length being handed out by the World Bank. The World Bank also stands out as the only system in which the baseline sanction (a starting point of three years debarment) is the same for all its exclusion grounds e.g. Fraud, Corruption, Collusion and Obstruction. Responses also indicated that the World Bank and Tunisia were the only jurisdictions for which poor performance is not a ground for exclusion.

The pilot report is undoubtedly a valuable tool in understanding the methodology of a variety exclusion mechanisms. Six of the jurisdictions surveyed also revealed the ability to exercise cross-debarment which is a discretionary power that permits the exclusion of a supplier debarred in another jurisdiction. Time will tell if this initiative does lead to development of best practices as its authors hope. Beyond that however it would not appear that any global effort towards harmonisation of these increasingly prominent debarment powers is on the agenda.

US Supreme Court Restricts the World Bank Group’s Immunities

By | International Organisations, Multilateral Development Banks | No Comments

The Supreme Court of the United States has rejected the stance taken by the International Finance Corporation that it holds an absolute immunity from legal suit. The IFC had relied on a complete immunity to prevent a legal action being brought against it by a group of local fishermen, farmers and villagers from Gugarat, India. Mr Budha Ismail Jam and others claim that a power plant financed by the IFC had caused widespread and harmful pollution of the air, land and water in the surrounding area.

The IFC, part of the World Bank Group, argued that it’s immunity provision, under which it is granted the same immunity from suit as that of foreign states, should be interpreted as an “absolute immunity”. It also argued that a flood of foreign plaintiff litigation and exposure to money damages would be the undesirable result of anything less than absolute immunity. The Supreme Court took the view these concerns were “inflated”. It also noted that other international organisations such as the UN and IMF had specified absolute immunity from judicial process in their charters, which was not the case for the IFC.

Neil Macaulay, Co-Head of Chambers at BWL, believes this was a particularly bad decision for the World Bank Group, which has always strenuously sought to maximise its immunities from legal suit. Mr Jam and his neighbours have now exposed a clear chink in the World Bank Groups armour. However the ruling does caution that “restrictive immunity hardly means unlimited exposure to suit for international organisations”. There are still many hurdles that Mr Ram and his fellow petitioners must yet clear before the restricted immunity can be pierced in the lower courts. Overall however the clarification of the limits of the World Bank’s immunities for its commercial activities is to be welcomed.  The decision is also likely to increase accountability of the World Bank’s activities through the availability of judicial scrutiny by the national courts and draw greater attention from the international media on the social and environmental impact of its projects.

For the full decision see here.

Fraud dominates investigations at the Asian Development Bank 

By | Banques de développement, International Organisations, Multilateral Development Banks, News | No Comments

The Office of Anticorruption and Integrity at the Asian Development Bank has just released a pie-chart that provides valuable insight into the focus of its ongoing investigations into sanctionable practices. The key takeaway from the chart is that fraud, running at three quarters of all investigations over the last ten months, overwhelmingly makes up the largest slice of the investigative pie and corruption is the smallest slice at only two percent.

These ADB figures for 2018 are generally consistent with long term trends across the MDBs where corruption cases may grab the headlines but in the vast majority of instances it is fraud that lies at the core of most of the enforcement action brought by their integrity offices.

One question thrown up by the figures for corporates bidding on MDB funded projects to consider is whether they are matching this fraud risk with an equal proportion of their compliance efforts. Neil Macaulay, Co-Head of Chambers at Bretton Woods Law, believes there is a danger that the scale and nature of the risk of committing fraud can easily be underestimated by corporates when setting up their anti-bribery and corruption programs. Given that the base sanction for fraud and corruption violations are the same, with a three-year debarment start point, this could be a costly misjudgement.

MDB investigators routinely focus on procurement frauds as they are generally more widespread and easier to identify and prove than other sanctionable practices such as corrupt bribe payments, which by their nature are more likely to be concealed. Typically, an MDB procurement fraud, known as a misrepresentation, might involve misconduct through a wide range of means including; failure to declare an agent or commission payments, embellished c.v. qualifications or performance track record, forged bid securities, false invoicing and mis-description of joint venture responsibilities. This list is by no means exhaustive and misrepresentations can occur at all stages of the bidding and contract execution processes and the misstatement usually appears on the face of the available project records, which help to explain why fraud carries the greatest risk of debarment and sanction in MDB funded projects.

The Inaugural World Bank Group Sanctions System Annual Report FY18 Reveals a Sharp Rise in Settlements

By | International Organisations, Multilateral Development Banks, News | No Comments

The World Bank Group (WBG) has published for the first time a joint report showing the key figures for debarments, cross-debarments and referrals made in the FY2018 under the WBG Sanctions System. The report collates the figures for sanctions, in particular the number and length of debarments, imposed through the means of settlements with the Integrity Vice Presidency (INT), determinations by the Suspension and Debarment Officer (SDO) and the decisions of the Sanctions Board. In addition, the report also contains figures for the last five years that reveal the increasing use of settlements to deal with fraud, corruption, collusion and obstruction infractions under the Bank’s Sanctions System.

Sanction settlements have multiplied from just seven to thirty-nine cases per year between 2014 and 2018, whilst the number of sanctions issued through the SDO’s determinations have fallen over the same period from forty-five to twenty-four cases. Disposals by the Sanctions Board have remained fairly constant over the five-year period with an increase of just one to twenty cases.

Neil Macaulay, Co-Head of Chambers at Bretton Woods Law, believes the continuing sharp increase in settlements over the last year may be readily explained since the vast majority of the shortest periods of debarment have been imposed through negotiated settlements. In other words settlements have become more attractive to those entities facing the sanctions process as the periods of debarment being negotiated with INT are increasingly considered acceptable.

The report helps to puts some statistical flesh on the bones. Of the twenty-nine cases with the shortest periods of debarment, those from one year and six months and below, only one was a result of a determination of the SDO, four emanate from the Sanctions Board and twenty-four were achieved by negotiation settlement with INT.
Significantly these lower penalty settlements also include five cases of ‘conditional non-debarment’ which permit the entities concerned to remain eligible for World Bank funded work provided they engage in remedial integrity compliance work. The growing attractiveness of settlements and the arrival of a new Vice President at INT, Pascale Dubois, is likely to be more than co-incidental, as she is keen to express in the report the benefits of settling sanctions matters in terms of the saving of resources and certainty of outcome for both the investigated party and the WBG.

Those companies that self-report misconduct receive particular praise from Dubois in the following terms:
“For example, two INT cases this year led to settlements with a sanction of ‘conditional non-debarment’ which means the sanctioned company remains eligible to participate in WBG-financed projects as long as it complies with certain obligations. This incentivises good corporate behavior as the companies in these cases came forward voluntarily and disclosed their misconduct. This approach also enables the type of responsible corporate citizens the Bank wants on its projects to continue to be eligible to contribute to the Bank’s mission.”

Ms. Dubois’ plainly incentive words regarding self-reporting appear to be backed up by the reported figures. All five of the cases listed as resolved by conditional non-debarment were arrived at through settlement with INT.

By stark contrast nearly all the cases resulting in the longest periods of debarment emanate from either the Sanctions Board or the SDO. Of the thirty-one most severe sanctions awarded, upwards from three years to ten and a half years debarment, only three arise from settlements and the bulk are divided between the Sanctions Board with nine disposals and the SDO with nineteen.

Overall the WBG report is to be commended as it provides a welcome degree of transparency into the current trends in disposals of sanctions cases by the three distinct limbs that comprise of the WBG Sanctions System and points towards the likelihood of a more favourable debarment outcome through settlement than the alternatives, even taking into account the additional co-operation requirements INT may require under a settlement. It therefore enables those who may be subject to an investigation by INT to make a more informed approach as to the relative merits of settling the case early or running through the SDO/Sanctions Board process.

Any companies, directors, consultants or individuals requiring assistance in dealing with the WBG Sanctions System are welcome to contact the experts in the BWL MDB Team through enquiries@brettonwoodslaw.com

Access The full WBG report >

Fighting Corruption is MY Responsibility: the Annual Report of the Asian Development Bank Office of Anticorruption and Integrity

By | Bribery, Corruption, Cross debarment, Debarment, Fraud, Multilateral Development Banks, Sanctions Board | No Comments

The Asian Development Bank (ADB)’s Office of Anticorruption and Integrity (‘OAI’) has released its 2016 Annual Report entitled Fighting Corruption is MY Responsibility (the ‘Report’).

OAI’s external mandate is carried out by its Investigations Division which reviews complaints and conducts investigations into allegations of integrity violations; the Due Diligence Unit undertakes its integrity due diligence functions, whilst the Review and Outreach Unit handles project procurement-related reviews and capacity development activities.

The ADB defines ‘integrity violations’ as any act which violates ADB’s Anticorruption Policy, including corrupt, fraudulent, coercive and collusive practices, the four sanctionable practices which are harmonised across other Multilateral Development Banks (‘MDBs’).

Somewhat surprisingly, the Report starts with the topic of Enhancing Tax Transparency in Asia and the Pacific. By approving an update to its Anticorruption Policy, the ADB has added its weight to the fight against tax secrecy, tax evasion and aggressive tax planning which erode domestic tax bases of the ADB’s developing member countries. That update will – according to OAI – support developing member countries to protect themselves against tax evasion, base erosion and profit shifting (‘BEPS’) and is significant because it is wider in scope than the traditional role of MDB anticorruption and integrity departments.

OAI reports that it had 211 open complaints from previous years and received 258 new complaints in the year 2016. Some 73% of the complaints received related to projects, 17 % to ADB staff and 10 % to ‘others’. The majority of complaints came to OAI via email, which is an indication both of the impact of technology on the operations of the Department and the ease with which complaints about companies and individuals may be made. From those, the focus of investigations was 53% on projects, 37% on ADB Staff with the remaining 10% falling within others. The sources of the complaints also makes for interesting reading, with 61% coming from parties external to the Bank and 35% from ADB staff, whilst only 2% came from audit reviews with the remaining 2% from anonymous sources. Despite these figures, the Report emphasises OAI’s proactive use of Project Procurement-Related Reviews (‘PPRRs’) of on-going ADB-financed projects. Once again, their scope is wide, for they seek to identify ‘noncompliance issues, irregularities, and integrity concerns, with respect to project procurement, disbursements, and delivery of project outputs’ and so firms which are working on Bank-financed contracts must remain diligent to ensure that staff and contractors continue to comply with the strict requirements that come with working with an MDB.

‘Fraud’ accounted for 73% of new investigations in 2016 and OAI explained that investigations into corruption, coercion and collusion remained low due to the difficulty in establishing these sanctionable practices. Indeed, it should be remembered that the threshold for an allegation of fraud within the MDB sanctions regime is extremely low: the mere inclusion of a CV for someone whom the company knows is unavailable or where it is reckless as to that availability may give rise to liability, sanction and extremely serious consequences for a company, including debarment.

OAI stated that it continued to fight corruption through both enforcement and prevention. In 2016, 138 entities, including 98 firms and 40 individuals were debarred as a result of integrity violations, bringing the cumulative total number of firms debarred to 1,261 by the end of the year. Indeed, under the agreement with other MDBs to mutually enforce each other’s debarment actions, the ADB cross-debarred 86 firms and 47 individuals and submitted 10 firms and eight individuals for cross-debarment to participating MDBs. Further, nine firms and one individual were conditionally non-debarred, whilst temporary suspension, a measure which was first introduced in 2013 in the ADB, was issued to one firm and one individual in the year 2016. OAI also completed 33 investigations where ADB staff were found to have engaged in integrity violations, 11 of whom received disciplinary sanction.

Surprisingly, OAI received a mere six appeals in 2016, involving just three firms and six indivduals; five of these and two pending from 2015 were denied because they did not meet the requirements for an appeal to be considered by the Sanctions Appeals Committee, a point which demonstrates the importance of engaging specialist counsel to advise on and prepare such matters.

OAI used its investigative findings to make recommendations in respect of preventive measures and by requiring subjects of investigations to improve their governance and integrity processes through conditional non-debarments, debarments with conditions and reinstatement processes.

The ADB views integrity violations as potential reputational risks and with that in mind, ADB project teams submitted 300 Integrity Due Diligence (IDD) advisory and review requests to OAI’s Due Diligence Unit, covering 644 entities. This was an 86% increase in the number of entities reviewed from 2015. OAI’s Due Diligence Unit was created in response to an increased need for ADB to evaluate and minimise integrity and reputational risks in its private sector projects, as well as taking into account its increased lending and development initiatives involving private companies; indeed, 52% percent of the total entities reviewed were actually identified by the Private Sector Operations Department.

In addition, there is a separate independent grievance process – ADB’s Accountability Mechanism – which receives complaints from entities which claim to have been adversely affected by an ADB-financed project which has resulted from the ADB’s noncompliance with its operational policies and procedures. The major areas of complaint are resettlement, compensation and land acquisition, and adverse environmental impacts.

The lawyers at Bretton Woods Law have unique and unparalleled experience of assisting companies and individuals with their interactions with the OAI. If you have any questions arising out of the issues raised in this article, do not hesitate to contact a member of the team via enquiries@brettonwoodslaw.com

Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank closes its Doors to Corrupt Bidders

By | Multilateral Development Banks, News | No Comments

The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (‘AIIB’) is the latest Multilateral Development Bank (‘MDB’) to join the ranks of the other long-established MDBs such as the African Development Bank (‘AfDB’), Asian Development Bank (‘ADB’), the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (‘EBRD’), the Inter-Amerian Development Bank (‘IADB’) and the World Bank (‘WB’). In furtherance of this objective, the AIIB has announced that it will voluntarily and unilaterally enforce debarment decisions of the other MDBs within its own sanctions regime. Although not yet formally a signatory to the Agreement on Mutual Enforcement of Debarment Decisions (the ‘Agreement’) dated 9th April 2010, the effect of the AIIB’s decision is to render any debarment decisions of the other MDBs which qualify for cross debarment, also applicable at the AIIB, such that nearly one thousand companies which find themselves debarred by the other MDBs will also be ineligible to bid on contracts at the AIIB.

This unilateral action is, of course, likely to be a precursor to the AIIB becoming a formal signatory to the Agreement whereupon decisions within the sanctions regime of the AIIB which qualify for cross debarment will also have effect at the other MDBs. However, whilst the AIIB recognises the harmonised sanctionable practices contained in the Agreement (i.e. ‘fraudulent’, ‘corrupt’, ‘collusive’ and ‘coercive’ practices), it also casts its net wider than the other MDBs by listing three further prohibited practices, namely, ‘obstruction’, ‘theft’ and ‘misuse of resources’.

This announcement comes not long after President Jin Liqun of the AIIB stated publically at the European Financial Forum that he viewed the role of the AIIB as being that of steward of taxpayers’ money from many different countries – a position which requires the highest bar for integrity and compliance.

The AIIB has appointed Hamid Sharif to the post of Director General of its Compliance, Effectiveness and Integrity Unit (‘CEIU’) which has been set up to lead the charge against corruption on bank-financed projects. Sharif notes that:

“AIIB’s institutional arrangements creates increased accountability and transparency because I report directly to our Board of Directors as the head of the integrity unit. This creates an open channel that will improve the bank’s ability to react and deal with any suspicions of corruption or unethical behaviour in our projects”.

On 8th December 2016, the AIIB published its Policy on Prohibited Practices (the ‘Policy’) in which it made it clear that all parties are “to adhere to the highest ethical standards” whilst also creating the authority for the conduct of investigations by an Investigations Officer into allegations of prohibited conduct by parties who engage with the Bank. In the context of the AIIB Policy, ‘party’ means any party (and its respective officers, employees and agents), who:

  1. in the case of a Project financed by a Sovereign-backed Financing, is involved in such Project, including, inter alia, recipients of Financing, beneficiaries of technical cooperation, bidders, suppliers, contractors, subcontractors, consultants, sub- consultants, service providers, applicants, concessionaires and financial intermediaries; or
  2. in the case of a Project financed by a Non-sovereign-backed Financing, is involved in such Project, including, inter alia, borrowers, sponsors, recipients of Financing, beneficiaries of technical cooperation, bidders, suppliers, contractors, subcontractors, consultants, sub-consultants, service providers, applicants, concessionaires, financial intermediaries, guaranteed parties, and investee companies; or
  3. contracts with the Bank for advisory services to be performed by the Bank. 
  4. contracts with the Bank in relation to the Bank’s corporate procurement or any other matter not covered by the preceding three clauses, except for Bank Personnel.

Given the very significant impact that cross debarment can have on the ability of a company to do business, parties which find themselves under investigation, or which receive a Statement of Charges from an Investigation Officer or a Notice of Administrative Action from the Sanctions Officer should recognise that the way in which such matters are handled at the early stages can have a lasting impact on the case and a company’s future.

The lawyers at Bretton Woods Law are uniquely placed to deal with investigations, negotiated resolution agreements (‘NRAs’) and sanctions proceedings within the regimes of the multilateral development banks.

Contact Bretton Woods Law: enquiries@brettonwoodslaw.com

International Events and Opportunities

By | International Administrative Law, Multilateral Development Banks, News | No Comments

Earlier this month, a delegation of seven barristers from different sets of Chambers including Alex Haines from Bretton Woods Law and Bar Council representatives including the Chairman of the Bar, travelled to Seoul and Shanghai for a four-day business development mission. The delegation spent two days in Seoul on 4th and 5th April, where it was joined by four barristers from the Korean Exchange Programme for young lawyers, who were spending two weeks in Korean law firms. On 6th and 7th April, the delegation moved onto Shanghai for the second part of the mission.

Bar Council business development missions are aimed at promoting barristers’ expertise as advocates in international dispute resolution and at raising awareness of the ability of foreign law firms and clients to instruct the Bar directly. All business development missions organised by the Bar Council provide a platform for barristers to network with local lawyers and better understand the local markets, and build relationships with local bar associations with a view to exploring opportunities for further collaboration. Given the ever increasing link between the rise in barristers’ income from international work and the challenges faced by the profession domestically, it has never been as important as it is today to generate new connections and consolidate existing relationships. In the case of China, the Bar Council has been running a training scheme for Chinese lawyers since 1986. This mission was also the third to Seoul since 2011, meaning that there was already a solid connection between the Bar and its counterparts in South Korea and China.

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BWL Academic Member – Rishi Gulati – Presents at NYU on International Organisations Immunities on 11 April 2016

By | Administrative Law, IAL, International Administrative Law, Multilateral Development Banks, News | No Comments

Monday, April 11, 2016  |  12:30 PM – 2:00 PM
Seminar Room 110, Furman Hall, 245 Sullivan Street

IO Immunity: Access to Justice Denied?

International Organisations (“IOs”) enjoy jurisdictional immunities before domestic courts.  The effect of such immunities is that, generally speaking, national courts refuse to adjudicate disputes where an IO is sued, and where that IO refuses to waive its immunity from suit. Traditionally, IO immunities have been absolute, and generally speaking domestic courts refuse to pierce it. This means that often, individuals and private parties who may have a grievance against an IO, in seeking a remedy, are left to the mercy of the IO’s internal justice system, or to alternative forms of dispute resolution such as arbitration, which can be expensive and opaque. 

In this presentation, I will first, highlight the kinds of disputes that may arise between IOs and private parties. Second, I focus on disputes between IOs and its staff, a common occurrence, showing that such employees may often be left without a remedy. Given that such cases arise frequently, this is a fertile ground to analyse how the principles on IO immunities are developing and work in practice. Finally, I discuss the ongoing Haiti litigation, and the case law from the European Court of Human Rights regarding the right to access to courts and its bearing on IO immunity. I will conclude by making observations whether or not these decisions have succeeded in enhancing access to justice.

Further details > 

The EBRDAT reaffirms the application of general principles of international administrative law to the internal law of the EBRD and criticises it for being “exceedingly pedantic”

By | Administrative Law, IAL, International Administrative Law, Multilateral Development Banks, News | One Comment

Following the successful appeals to the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development Administrative Tribunal (“EBRDAT”) in the cases of Kominek & Others v EBRD (see: EBRD 2013/AT/01 and EBRD 2013/AT/02), Neil Macaulay of Bretton Woods Law (“BWL”) has secured another victory in the case of Grassi v EBRD (see: EBRD 2016/AT/01).  On the 18th January 2016, the EBRDAT allowed Mr Grassi’s (“Appellant”) appeal against the 9th September 2015 decision by the EBRD President adopting the recommendation of the Bank’s Grievance Committee (“GC”).  The GC, which sits as the body of first instance in the Bank’s internal justice system and below the EBRDAT, had recommended not to exercise its jurisdiction over all the elements contained in the Appellant’s ‘Request for an Administrative Review Decision’ (“RARD”) on the basis that it had been submitted outside the relevant procedural deadline, and was thus time-barred.  The time limit for the submission of the Appellant’s RARD landed on a non-working day (i.e., Saturday) but was submitted the next working day (i.e., Monday).  The EBRDAT found that, contrary to the GC’s recommendation and contrary to the Bank’s arguments, the Appellant’s RARD had, in fact, been timely submitted on the Monday, even if, strictly speaking, it came after the Saturday deadline.  The EBRDAT had “no hesitation to ‘remedy’ the anomaly in the Grievance Procedures by way of a liberal interpretation” (see: paragraph 33 of the judgment).

The EBRDAT’s judgment adopted the arguments raised by the Appellant, and relied, inter alia, on best practices of other Multilateral Development Banks (“MDBs”) (e.g., the International Monetary Fund (“IMF”) and the African Development Bank (“AfDB”)).  The rules of procedure at the Administrative Tribunals of a number of international organisations allow, as do many national systems, for the filing of a grievance on a ‘next working day’, thus preventing the unfair situation that had arisen in the Appellant’s case.  The Bank had argued that the procedural rules should be interpreted strictly, despite the apparent prejudice in this case.  The EBRDAT, however, relied on a judgment from the Administrative Tribunal of the International Labour Organisation (“ILOAT“) (see: Judgement No. 2882, at consideration 6) and further found that “the Bank’s interpretation is exceedingly pedantic and formalistic, and would unduly hinder the Staff Member from defending his right effectively” (see: EBRD 2016/AT/01, at paragraph 33).

In its judgement, the EBRDAT also took into account of the contra proferentem rule, natural justice, and fairness as a principle of international administrative law.  Although the EBRDAT did not take the case of Kominek into account because its facts were different, that case also resulted in the EBRAT criticising the Bank for complicating matters unnecessarily: “Voluminous arguments and numerous documents have been submitted to the Judges, who have read them and concluded that this matter has been treated by the Bank as exceedingly complex when it is in effect quite simple. Indeed, it seems important that ordinary Staff Members perceive that the options for vindicating their rights are straightforward, lest they be intimidated by the ostensible prolixity (and attended costs) of the grievance system” (see: EBRD 2013/AT/01, at paragraph 21).

The latest EBRDAT decision is a victory for common sense: it remedies an exceedingly pedantic and formalistic approach depriving staff members from effectively defending their rights naturally, justly and fairly; it provides useful guidance for the GC on how to interpret the Bank’s internal laws; and it reaffirms the application of general principles of international administrative law to the internal law of the Bank with a view to filling its lacunas.

Read more >

The BWL IAL team can be contacted at enquires@brettonwoodslaw.com

 

BREAKING NEWS

By | Development Banks, Multilateral Development Banks, News | No Comments

The African Development Bank with BWL Assistance Settles Sanction Case with Hitachi Ltd of Japan

The African Development Bank (“AfDB”) has today announced in Abidjan that it has entered into a Settlement Agreement with Hitachi Ltd of Japan, which brings to an end the three-year investigation undertaken by the AfDB’s Integrity and Anti-Corruption Department (“IACD”).  IACD had alleged that two Hitachi companies – the German based Hitachi Power Europe GmbH (“HPE”) and its South African subsidiary Hitachi Power Africa (Pty) Ltd (“HPA”) – had engaged in sanctionable practices in order to be awarded in South Africa in 2007 the AfDB financed Medupi Power Station Boiler Works Contract.

BWL’s Lee Marler and Neil Macaulay have represented IACD in this matter for the past two years and an international BWL team instructed by IACD (and comprised of Marler, Macaulay, Alan Sarhan and Ayman Daher (the latter two from BWL Canada)) will now proceed to assist Hitachi Ltd in fulfilling its settlement obligations to the AfDB.

The full text of today’s AfDB press release reads as follows:

“Abidjan, Côte d’lvoire Wednesday, 2nd December 2015 – The African Development Bank Group (“AfDB”) announces that on 2nd November 2015 it concluded a Settlement Agreement with Hitachi, Ltd.  (“Hitachi”) of Tokyo, Japan.

The Settlement Agreement follows a three year investigation by the AfDB’s Integrity and Anti-Corruption Department (the “IACD”) into allegations of sanctionable practices by certain Hitachi subsidiaries on the AfDB financed Medupi Power Station Boiler Works Contract in the Republic of South Africa. The IACD alleged that at the material time Hitachi Power Europe GmbH (“HPE”) based in Germany and its South African subsidiary, Hitachi Power Africa (Pty) Ltd (“HPA”), engaged in sanctionable practices in order to be awarded the boiler works contract.

The AfDB acknowledges that Hitachi and its affiliates co-operated fully and openly with the IACD investigation, and that Hitachi was determined throughout to maintain its good relations with the AfDB and to protect the integrity of the Medupi project.  Despite their differences, both parties shared a desire to resolve the current difficulties by way of settlement.

Due in part to the high level of assistance provided to the IACD by Hitachi, the AfDB has agreed to impose the sanction of debarment for twelve months with conditional release upon HPE and HPA, the two companies at the centre of the IACD investigation.  Debarment will be terminated as soon as Hitachi enhances its integrity compliance programme to the standard set by the AfDB’s Integrity Compliance Guidelines.  Moreover, Hitachi has voluntarily agreed (1) to make a substantial financial contribution to the AfDB, which will be used to fund worthy anti-corruption causes on the African continent; and (2) to co-operate with the IACD on a variety of matters, including enhancing where necessary its existing integrity compliance programme referenced above.

The sanctions imposed under the settlement agreement reflect the level of cooperation provided by Hitachi, Ltd. in the investigation of the Medupi matter, for which the IACD is grateful”, said Anna Bossman, Director of the IACD.  “Hitachi has shown by its actions that it is committed to doing business in an ethical manner and the IACD believes in giving credit for such dedication.  As I have said before, the IACD is ever willing to resolve amicably allegations of sanctionable practices with companies that show a sincere commitment to integrity, who collaborate in the resolution of allegations and who elect to enhance their compliance polices and procedures.

On 30th October 2007, Eskom awarded the AfDB financed Medupi Power Station Boiler Works Contract for the design, manufacture, supply, erection and commissioning of six coal fired steam generator units at its Medupi plant at Lephalale in the Limpopo Province of South Africa to the consortium of HPE and HPA.  Mr Johann Benöhr led the IACD investigation with support from Ms Funmilayo Akinosi and Mr Simeon Obidairo.  Lee Marler, Neil Macaulay and Alex Haines of Bretton Woods Law, London represented the IACD.”

Separately, Hitachi Ltd also settled on 28th September 2015 with the United States’ Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) and its press release of the same day, in which it acknowledged the assistance provided by IACD and by implication BWL, reads as follows:

“Washington D.C., Sept. 28, 2015 — The Securities and Exchange Commission today charged Tokyo-based conglomerate Hitachi, Ltd. with violating the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) when it inaccurately recorded improper payments to South Africa’s ruling political party in connection with contracts to build two multi-billion dollar power plants.

Hitachi has agreed to pay $19 million to settle the SEC charges.

The SEC alleges that Hitachi sold a 25-percent stake in a South African subsidiary to a company serving as a front for the African National Congress (ANC).  This arrangement gave the front company and the ANC the ability to share in the profits from any power station contracts that Hitachi secured.  Hitachi was ultimately awarded two contracts to build power stations in South Africa and paid the ANC’s front company approximately $5 million in “dividends” based on profits derived from the contracts.  Through a separate, undisclosed arrangement, Hitachi paid the front company an additional $1 million in “success fees” that were inaccurately booked as consulting fees without appropriate documentation.

“Hitachi’s lax internal control environment enabled its subsidiary to pay millions of dollars to a politically-connected front company for the ANC to win contracts with the South African government,” said Andrew J. Ceresney, Director of the SEC’s Enforcement Division.  “Hitachi then unlawfully mischaracterized those payments in its books and records as consulting fees and other legitimate payments.”

According to the SEC’s complaint filed in U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia:

  • Hitachi was aware that Chancellor House Holdings (Pty) Ltd. was a funding vehicle for the ANC during the bidding process.
  • Hitachi nevertheless continued to partner with Chancellor and encourage the company to use its political influence to help obtain government contracts from Eskom Holdings SOC Ltd., a public utility owned and operated by the South African government.
  • Hitachi paid “success fees” to Chancellor for its exertion of influence during the Eskom tender process pursuant to a separate, unsigned side-arrangement.

Hitachi’s misconduct violated the books and records and internal accounting controls provisions of the federal securities laws, specifically Sections 13(b)(2)(A) and 13(b)(2)(B) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.

Without admitting or denying the SEC’s allegations, Hitachi agreed to a settlement that would require the company to pay a $19 million penalty, and it would be permanently enjoined from future violations.  The settlement is subject to court approval.

The SEC’s investigation was conducted by Jon Jordan and Thierry Olivier Desmet of the FCPA Unit in Miami with assistance from Kathleen Strandell, David S. Johnson, and Matthew P. Cohen.  The SEC appreciates the assistance of the Justice Department’s Fraud Section, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Integrity and Anti-Corruption Department of the African Development Bank, and the South African Financial Services Board.

“We particularly appreciate the assistance we received from the African Development Bank’s Integrity and Anti-Corruption Department and hope this is the first in a series of collaborations,” said Kara Brockmeyer, Chief of the SEC Enforcement Division’s FCPA Unit.””

BWL barristers are renowned experts in the sanctions procedures operated by the world’s multilateral development banks (“MDB’s”), such as the African Development Bank (“AfDB”), the Asian Development Bank (“AsDB”), the Inter American Development Bank (“IADB”) and the World Bank Group.

Lee Marler, BWL’s co-head of Chambers, is quoted as saying that “we are very proud to be IACD’s standing counsel and we are delighted to have assisted the Department these past years in bringing the Medupi case to a successful conclusion, but we are equally proud to be able to represent our other clients before the anti-corruption units, sanctions boards and committees of the other MDBs.  Our strength is our depth of knowledge and unparalleled experience, for at BWL we prosecute for the AfDB but defend everywhere else and it is this rich mix that serves to ensure that we give balanced and objective advice to all of our MDB clients”.

The BWL MDB team can be contacted at enquiries@brettonwoodslaw.com